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Major-General Roger Rowley and
the Failure of Military Reform,
1958-1969
PETER KASURAK
Abstract : Many consider the pre-Unification Canadian Army to have
achieved the apogee of professionalism, but long-term progress did not
result. Major-General Roger Rowley led three major reforms of the
Canadian Army and the Canadian Forces during the 1958-1969 period:
the reform of the Canadian Army Staff College, the restructuring of the
Army through the Army Tactics and Organization Board and the reform
of the military profession and officer development through the Officer
Development Board. The failure of Rowley’s initiatives reveals the limits
of knowledge-based professionalism, collegial decision making and the
development of a national strategic perspective in the armed forces of the
1960s and 1970s.

R

“

eform” is not a subject

subject that occurs to many historians
when thinking of the early Cold War Canadian Army. According
to the consensus view of Canadian historians, the 1945 to 1968
period was the height of Army professionalism. Jack Granatstein
in fact titles his chapter on this period in Canada’s Army “The
Professional Army.” He says it was “the golden age of Canadian
military professionalism” and praises its efficiency, the creation of
a “true General Staff” and Army Headquarters as a “centre for
policy and planning.” In The Administration of Defence Policy in
Canada, Douglas Bland opposes the golden “Command Era” of 1946
to 1964 with the rather leaden “Management Era” which followed.
John A. English calls the army that emerged from the Second World

© Canadian Military History 2020

Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2020

1

Canadian Military History, Vol. 29 [2020], Iss. 2, Art. 7
2

Rowley and the Failure of Military Reform

War “the best little army in the world” and the immediate post-war
period “the flowering of professionalism.”1
There is substantial evidence to support this point of view. The
Army had established the Canadian Army Staff College in 1946 and
was moving away from its dependence on the British Army. It was
meeting the emerging challenge of tactical nuclear war by expanding
its use of operations research and through the establishment of a
combat development function.2 Yet all was not well. Internally,
elements of the Canadian Army’s British inheritance created
challenges to modernisation. Externally, the disruption of Paul
Hellyer’s integration and unification of armed services redirected or
cancelled single service reforms. Progressives would fail to create an
army based on professional knowledge and one which would be a
strong contributor to the development of national strategy.
Internal difficulties had their origin in the British Army heritage
of the Canadian Army. While part of an imperial army it had never
had to develop policy or doctrine on its own and its first attempts
in the post-war period were far from successful. Initial efforts to
develop national doctrine were impaired by the British Army culture
shared by the Canadian Army. The British Army itself had failed
to implement a successful doctrine for mechanised war and relied on
commanders of divisions and higher formations to muddle through
based on their own innate genius and intuition. This was combined
with authoritarian leadership that stripped junior levels of initiative.3
Battlefield success imprinted these traits on the post-war Canadian
Army. The 1955-56 Exercise Gold Rush exemplified this leadership
1  
J.L. Granatstein, Canada’s Army: Waging War and Keeping the Peace (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 2002), 341-42; Douglas Bland, The Administration of
Defence Policy in Canada, 1947-1985 (Kingston: Ronald P. Frye & Company, 1987),
1-12; and John A. English, Lament for an Army: The Decline of Canadian Military
Professionalism (Toronto: Irwin Publishing, 1998), 46-50.
2  
Howard G. Coombs, “In Search of Minerva’s Owl: Canada’s Army and Staff
Education (1946-1995)” (Ph.D. dissertation, Queen’s University, 2010); Andrew B.
Godefroy, In Peace Prepared: Innovation and Adaptation in Canada’s Cold War
Army (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2014); and Sean M. Maloney, An Identifiable Cult: The
Evolution of Combat Development in the Canadian Army, 1946-1965, Directorate of
Land Strategic Concepts Report 9905 (Kingston: Department of National Defence,
1999).
3  
David French, Raising Churchill’s Army: The British Army and the War against
Germany, 1919-1945 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 21-22, 201, 278-80;
and David French, “Doctrine and Organization in the British Army, 1919-1932” The
Historical Journal 44, 2 (2001): 514-15.
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style. Gold Rush was Chief of the General Staff (CGS) Guy Simonds’
attempt to develop doctrine for tactical nuclear war. Determined
that supply up to division be done by “flying truck” STOL aircraft,
Simonds overruled both his scientific advisor and study director when
they raised practical, technological difficulties. He simply dictated the
tactical concept to the team. In true British Army fashion, the next
CGS, Howard Graham, ditched Gold Rush and replaced it with his
own incompatible concept. A similar story of senior officer diktat and
staff advice ignored can be seen in the Army’s attempt to develop an
armoured personnel carrier, the Bobcat. Unable to pass a technical
evaluation and costing twice as much as the American M113, it was
eventually abandoned.4
Bernd Horn and Bill Bentley suggest that the simplicity of
Cold War alliance strategy and routinisation of defence tasks was
debilitating. In their opinion it was the conventional North American
Treaty Organization (NATO) warfighting framework that “nurtured
a system that relied on the traditional military concept that leadership
is a top-down hierarchical action that depends on unit command
and staff appointments, specifically experience, as the mechanism
to prepare individuals for higher command at the strategic level.”
Within this model, education was not important and a hierarchical
“industrial age” leadership culture with a directive and authoritarian
approach predominated.5 Douglas Bland, though viewing what he
calls “the Command Era” more favourably, notes that it was marked
by “command authority, military concepts for decision-making and
administration, … and a reliance on subjectivity based on experience.”6
Equally regressive was the inherited British Army preference for
officership based on character rather than professional knowledge.
In the early post-war period General Charles Foulkes, the chairman
of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, advocated for a degreed officer
corps, recruiting officers from civilian universities and then sending

4  
Peter Kasurak, A National Force: The Evolution of Canada’s Army, 1950-2000
(Vancouver: UBC Press, 2013), 29-34; and Peter Kasurak, Canada’s Mechanized
Infantry: The Evolution of a Combat Arm, 1920-2012 (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2020),
87-109. Godefroy excuses Simonds leadership style by saying that “institutional
inertia within the army was often strong” and that it took strong means to “overcome
these traditional obstacles” (Godefroy, In Peace Prepared, 127).
5  
Bernd Horn and Bill Bentley, Forced to Change: Crisis and Reform in the Canadian
Armed Forces (Toronto: Dundurn, 2015), 27-29.
6  
Bland, The Administration of Defence Policy in Canada, 5.
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them to the Royal Military College (RMC) for military-specific
education and training. However, as the military college system was
re-established, CGS Guy Simonds did not want to exclude “otherwise
suitable” candidates for want of an education and campaigned until
his retirement for entry into RMC from junior matriculation (Grade
10), with cadets graduating with only one year of university studies.
Other senior Canadian Army officers evidenced nostalgia for a British
class system that likely never existed in the form they imagined it.
Granatstein comments that the Canadian Army officer corps was
“resolutely ill-educated” with fewer than one-third having degrees
in the 1960s.7 This traditional—even anachronistic—orientation of
the Army would have two important impacts. It would distance the
Army from a country which was hard at the task of educating and
professionalising itself. It would also leave its own talent base thinner
and less able to provide analysis and policy advice.
Externally, the post-war structure of the Canadian Army was
disrupted by Minister of National Defence Paul Hellyer’s reorganisation
of the armed services; first by integrating the headquarters and
support services and then by total unification into a single Canadian
Armed Forces. The 1964 to 1972 period was one of constant
reorganisation and attempts to extract savings by combining systems
and organisations. The instability of the unification period would be
a key factor in the failure of Major-General Roger Rowley’s projects.8
At the end of the 1950s the current field force was performing
well, but the culture of the Canadian Army posed problems to those
trying to plan and implement a future force. The immediate problem
facing Rowley and the senior Army staff was how to remodel the
Canadian Army to address the challenges of the nuclear battlefield
while simultaneously building the capacity of the officer corps to
design and manage a modern force.
Roger Rowley (1914-2007) would seem, at first glance, to have
been an unlikely reformer. The son of the president of E.B. Eddy,
the Ottawa match and paper manufacturer, he was raised by his
mother and her sister due to the early death of his father. His aunt
had married Sir Francis Macnaughten, 8th Baronet, and they took

Kasurak, A National Force, 48-49; and Granatstein, Canada’s Army, 317.
Vernon J. Kronenberg, All Together Now: the Organization of the Department of
National Defence in Canada, 1964-1972 (Toronto: Canadian Institute of International
Affairs, 1973), 100-18.
7  
8  
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Major-General Roger Rowley. [Library and Archives Canada ZK-1958-2 ]

Roger and his elder brother John under their wing and taught them
to shoot, cast a fly and be gentlemen. He had a London tailor, shirt
maker, bootmaker and hatter. After education at Ottawa’s Ashbury
College and Dalhousie University, Rowley became a bond trader and
was commissioned as a militia officer in the Cameron Highlanders of
Ottawa in 1933. During the war he rose rapidly and was promoted
to acting lieutenant-colonel in 1943 and appointed commander of 5
Battle Wing, Canadian Training School in Great Britain. He reverted
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to major as the second in command of the Cameron Highlanders
and was promoted to lieutenant-colonel commanding the Stormont,
Dundas and Glengarry Highlanders just prior to the Scheldt campaign.
He was awarded the Distinguished Service Order for the capture of
Boulogne. Post-war, Rowley attended both the Canadian and British
Army staff colleges and the Imperial Defence College. He served in
a number of staff appointments in Army Headquarters, including
director of military operations and plans, director of infantry and
director of military training. From 1954 to 1957, Rowley commanded
the 2 Canadian Infantry Brigade Group in Europe.9
One might have expected that Rowley would have followed the
traditional side of Canadian Army culture as it existed from the prewar period right into the 1990s—Anglophilic, believing in leadership
based on personal qualities rather than training and education
and favouring hierarchical and rank-driven organisation based on
regimental loyalties. Yet, while Rowley was no rebel and was somewhat
of an organisation man, he did not conform to the traditional culture
in many important respects. He valued training and education highly,
worked by collaboration if not consensus, placed efficiency ahead of
tradition and supported a Canadian national army.
Rowley was at the centre of three major initiatives to modernise the
Army and the Canadian Forces: the redesign of the curriculum of the
Canadian Army Staff College, the organisational and tactical renewal
of the Army through the Army Tactics and Organization Board and
the reconceptualisation of the Canadian military profession through
the Officer Development Board. All three of these projects resulted
in initiatives and recommendations which today would be applauded.
At the time, they were all either overturned, shelved or rejected by
Rowley’s contemporaries. Rowley had the misfortune to be tasked
with major staff projects during a time of organisational change and
instability. He also had the misfortune to be on the losing side of a
debate between progressives and traditionalists on the character of
officership. An examination of Rowley’s three failed projects leads to
an understanding of the costs of service unification, the weaknesses

9  
Record of Service in the Canadian Army and the Canadian Armed Forces of
Major-General Roger Rowley, DSO, ED, CD, Library and Archives Canada [LAC];
and “Obituary: Major-General Roger Rowley,” The Daily Telegraph, 10 March
2007, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/obituaries/1545038/Major-General-RogerRowley.html.
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of the senior officer corps and the internal sources of collapse which
eventually became apparent in the Somalia Inquiry.

reforming the staff college
Rowley’s first appointment after commanding the brigade in Europe
was as the commandant of Canadian Army Staff College (CASC)
at Fort Frontenac in Kingston, Ontario. Rowley would begin his
tenure finding the Army in a state of doctrinal confusion, due to the
lack of a clear solution to nuclear war, and disinclined to raise its
educational sights, as a result of the contested need to do so.
In the late 1950s, the Canadian Army was just emerging from
dependency on the British Army. It had begun its first steps in
developing its own approach to war during the mid-1950s. Tactical
nuclear weapons made the deficiencies of motorised, road-bound mass
armies obvious. One Canadian officer commented after a field exercise
that the infantry on the nuclear battlefield “seem[ed] to be there only
to become casualties.”10 Initial attempts to develop nuclear tactics
were less than successful due to the inherent difficulty of the problem,
the lack of a combat development organisation and the Army’s topdown command and decision structure which undercut sound staff
analysis. Approved doctrine would not emerge until 1960.11
Rowley would also have to cope with the effects of the postSecond World War Canadian Army’s collective decision to recruit
officers based on character rather than intellectual capacity. This was
compounded by the Korean War which generated a requirement for
many junior officers which had been met by men “with a limited ability
to absorb advanced education.” Rowley would find that only 19 per
cent of applicants to the Staff College could pass the entrance exam
and another 19 per cent were admitted based upon a “supplemental”
pass which required additional work. The Army solved the problem
of a low pass rate by discontinuing entrance exams on the grounds

Major-General J.V. Allard to all GOC’s [General Officers Commanding] and
Brigade Commanders, December 1958, Record Group 73/1327, National Defence
Headquarters Directorate of History and Heritage Archives. Subsequent references
to National Defence Headquarters Directorate of History and Heritage Archives will
be as DHH.
11  
Kasurak, A National Force, 55.
10  
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that Staff College entrants had already been selected for promotion
to major by examination.12
Rowley was not the first person to recognise that the Staff
College curriculum required updating. His predecessor, BrigadierGeneral Pat Bogert, had written in the 1957 edition of Snowy
Owl, the Staff College journal, that nuclear warfare required major
changes to what was being taught. Rowley quickly came to the same
conclusion. He met with Lieutenant-General Graham, the chief of
the general staff, in May 1958 and argued that students were not
assimilating as much as they should nor gaining from their year at
Fort Frontenac. Rowley wanted to weed the program and provide
more time to practise the remaining subjects. Moreover, Rowley
argued that because Canadian formations were assigned to NATO’s
Northern Army Group, officers required the ability to function at the
theatre level. Officers also needed additional training to deal with
international staff appointments. Finally, Rowley wanted officers to
understand the relationship between the government and the armed
forces and the impact of science and technology on the future of
war. To achieve all this, he believed the course should be extended
from forty-five weeks to twenty months, including two months of
leave or private study. The product of the private study would be
a “major military paper” in the form of a thesis or a book review.13
Rowley was able to get Graham to accept his proposal that the
course be both lengthened and broadened. Graham in turn convinced
George Pearkes, the minister of national defence, to approve Rowley’s
proposal.14
By lengthening the course and adding strategic and arguably
“academic” elements to it, Rowley was embracing the progressive

Peter Kasurak, “Concepts of Professionalism in the Canadian Army, 1946-2000:
Regimentalism, Reaction, and Reform,” Armed Forces & Society 37, 1 (January
2011): 97-99.
13  
Rowley to DGMT [Director General Military Training], Canadian Army Staff
College – Policy, 10 June 1958, RG 76/157, DHH; and Howard Coombs, “Brigadier
Roger Rowley and the Canadian Army Staff College, 1958-1962,” in The Report of
the Officer Development Board: Maj-Gen Rowley and the Education of the Canadian
Forces, ed. Randall Wakelam and Howard Coombs (Waterloo, ON: LCMSDS Press
of Wilfrid Laurier University, 2010), xxviii.
14  
Coombs, “Brigadier Roger Rowley,” xxxivn11. Coombs notes that Graham made
the decision to lengthen the course, but Rowley’s 10 June 1958 memo to DGMT
makes it clear that he had made the original proposal in discussions with Graham
and the director of military training in May of that year.
12  
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school of thought—those that believed officership should be based
on expertise. Moreover, while the mandate of the Staff College was
to prepare officers for all branches of the staff “in peace and in
war,” the actual content of the curriculum had fallen short of these
aspirations.15 Rowley was insisting that it address its mandate by
including civil-military relations, scientific and technical developments
and international affairs as well as battlefield tactics.
Even tactics were a considerable problem. As the army did not
have a doctrinal manual of its own, the Staff College used a body of
material known as “Canadian Army Staff College Future Doctrine”
which was based on the knowledge and experience of College staff.
When the first army doctrine manual appeared in provisional form it
did not include a divisional headquarters, even though the Canadian
commitment to NATO was to field a division. Rather, it defined the
corps as the basic tactical unit and required the corps headquarters
to manage brigade groups directly.16 The final document, CAMT1-8,
The Infantry Brigade Group in Battle, published in 1960, at least
acknowledged the possibility of divisional headquarters.17 Rowley
found that even with this improvement, CAMT1-8 was inadequate
for teaching purposes. Unlike the Staff College doctrine, the official
manual was based on existing equipment and did not provide for
the improvements in mobility and firepower that were planned for
the 1964-65 future. In his opinion, it was vital that the Staff College
curriculum recognise the increased tactical use of air transport,
the inclusion of surface-to-surface missile nuclear fires, surface-toair missiles within the brigade group, tracked carriers for all units
and the quantities and types of communication equipment that were
actually in production. Major-General Jean Allard, the vice chief of
the general staff, agreed with most of Rowley’s recommendations and
thought that students coming off the 1961-63 course be prepared to
deal with the armoured personnel carrier-mounted army slated to
arrive in 1963. He instructed Rowley to carry on with the current
brigade headquarters until the new logistics concept was in place. He
did not foresee surface-to-air missile batteries at the brigade level, but

As quoted in Coombs, “Brigadier Roger Rowley,” xxxi. Italics added by Coombs.
Planning 1961-63 Staff Course, Prepared by Commandant CASC [Canadian Army
Staff College], 21 September 1960, RG 76/157, DHH.
17  
CAMT 1-8, The Infantry Brigade Group in Battle, Part 1 – Tactics, 1960, 55,
RG 81/344, DHH.
15  
16  
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rather at corps. Nevertheless, he thought their employment should be
part of the curriculum.18
Rowley had succeeded in overhauling the Staff College curriculum
and keeping pace with equipment changes, but his hopes that
students would become scholars appear to have failed. There was
only one paper published in Snowy Owl on national strategy and
student cartoons in the Staff College journal gently derided the selfstudy period, suggesting that it was mainly used to catch up on the
crush of work in the main program or in recovering from it.19 There
seemed to be no ground swell of enthusiasm from junior ranks for
strategic thought nor apparently much support from the top. As for
teaching doctrine that was future-oriented, Rowley’s initiative barely
lasted long enough for his chair to cool. His successor, Brigadier D.C.
Cameron, complained that only 23 per cent of the curriculum was
based on current doctrine and that “consideration must be given to
bringing the Canadian Army Staff College back into step with the
rest of the Canadian Army.” Cameron preferred to teach current
doctrine and have students discuss the impact of future weapons.
He also suggested that the course could be reduced in length.20 The
course was eventually reduced to one year in 1965 as part of an
overall effort to unify all staff training in the Canadian Forces. As a
result, the CASC became a junior staff course to mesh with the new
unified Canadian Forces College.

the army tactics and organization board (atob)
In September 1961, the government announced an increase of 11,571
personnel in the authorised strength of the Army to bring the
brigade in Europe up to its war establishment strength, provide for
reinforcements, bring field force units in Canada to war establishment

18  
Brig. [Brigadier] R. Rowley, Commandant CASC to MGen. [Major-General]
J.V. Allard, VCGS [Vice Chief of the General Staff], demi-official letter, 26
September 1960, RG 76/157, DHH; and Minutes of a Meeting Between VCGS
and Comdt CASC, Planning of 1961-63 Staff Course – General, 27 October 1960,
RG 76/157, DHH.
19  
Coombs, “Brigadier Roger Rowley” xxxi. See Snowy Owl 2, 3 (1963-1965): 114
as an example.
20  
Brig. D.C. Cameron, Cmdt CASC to VCGS, Tactical Doctrine, 1963-65 Course,
25 April 1962, RG 76/157, DHH.
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and form a divisional headquarters and signals unit. The divisional
headquarters was required so that Canada could meet its obligations
under NATO’s 1957 directive MC70, which called on the Supreme
Allied Commander Europe to prepare a response to any type of
incursion, possibly without the use of nuclear weapons. MC70 also
mandated integrating nuclear delivery systems, including artillery
and surface-to-surface missiles, into the Shield forces. Canada was
obligated to put the balance of 1 Canadian Infantry Division in
Europe by “M-day plus movement time,” that is, immediately.21
The primary role of divisional headquarters was to command
the division in war. Lieutenant-General Geoffrey Walsh, the CGS,
intended to mobilise the headquarters two to three months of the
year so that its staff would be trained in the battle role. When
not training for war, the headquarters would plan operations and
training.22 Walsh was not completely happy with the analysis of a
divisional organisation produced by his staff. It was a tour d’horizon
of foreign practices and an inventory of problems but lacked solutions.
He also faced pushback from the general officers commanding
(GOCs) of the geographical commands who feared the new divisional
headquarters would infringe on their authority. Walsh therefore
changed the peacetime mandate of the division headquarters to
that of a think tank and put Roger Rowley in charge to straighten
things out. The Division Headquarters was to conduct studies to
define tactical doctrine and to determine the method of command
and control within the Division. Rowley was given authority to visit
units and formations as he considered appropriate and reported
directly to the CGS. He was jointly appointed as Commander, Army
Tactics and Organization Board (ATOB) and Commander, Division
Headquarters. The terms of reference were more or less the same
as those of the Division Headquarters but added the responsibilities
of providing input to war games and operations research studies
and supervising user trials, field experiments and troop tests. The

MGen. J.P.E. Bernatchez, VCGS to GOC’s and Branch Heads, Army Manpower,
18 September 1961, Kardex 112.352 (D44), DHH; and Col. H.R.A. Parker, DMO&P
to DSD, Role and Location of HQ 1 Cdn Inf Div, 18 October 1961, Kardex 112.352
(D44), DHH.
22  
Col. H.R.A. Parker, DMO&P to DSD, Role and Location of HQ 1 Cdn Inf
Div, 18 October 1961, Kardex 112.352 (D44), DHH; and LGen. Walsh, CGS to
Chairman Army Policy Co-ordination Committee, 20 November 1961, Kardex
112.352 (D44), DHH.
21  
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peacetime staff of the ATOB/1 Canadian Division Headquarters was
fourteen officers and seventeen other ranks.23
Walsh demanded that the division fit within the Army’s
budgetary and manpower constraints which limited it to 19,000
personnel. According to Walsh, “[i]t will take some time to arrive
at this optimum divisional organization. It must, however, be ready
for examination at the next Tactical Symposium,” or in one year’s
time. He directed Rowley to outline tentative organisations as soon
as possible, trialed at unit stations during the winter and at field
concentrations the next summer. One Canadian brigade would be
trained in Russian tactics to act as an opposing force in the trials
and the other brigades would employ Canadian doctrine. He provided
Rowley with a list of the specific trials he wanted conducted.24
One wonders what Rowley thought of the task he had been given.
His small staff had been activated on 1 September and now, six weeks
later, he was given a job that the entire Army Headquarters had been
unable to satisfactorily accomplish and ordered to do it within a year!
Complicating his situation was the fact that the resources necessary
to test out ideas were controlled by the five GOCs who had already
indicated some jealousy of a Divisional Headquarters tasking their
resources. An additional problem was having to develop doctrine for
all levels of the organisation at the same time. For example, the
Army had decided to acquire the SS11B anti-tank missile, but it
was unclear whether it should (or even could) be mounted on the
Centurion tank. Micro-level issues such as this would have to be
decided at the same time as determining the overall architecture of
the division. Financial constraints and the manpower cap were other
complicating factors and potential option-killers. The prospects for
success of Rowley’s project cannot have looked especially good.

Brig. W.S. Murdoch, DGCS [Deputy Chief of the General Staff] to VAG [Vice
Adjutant General], VQMG [Vice Quartermaster General], DGPO [Director General
Plans and Operations], DGMT [Director General Military Training], Role and
Location – Headquarters 1 Canadian Infantry Division, 10 November 1961; Extract
from Minutes of the 61/42 Meeting of the Army Policy Coordination Committee,
24 November 1961; LGen. G. Walsh, CGS [Chief of the General Staff] to HQ Cmds
[Headquarters of Commands] and Branch Heads, Headquarters 1st Canadian
Infantry Division (HQ 1 Cdn Inf Div), Reactivation and Terms of Reference, 20 July
1962; and LGen. G. Walsh, CGS, SD 1 Letter No.62, Army Tactics and Organization
Board, Activation and Terms of Reference, all in Kardex 112.352 (D44), DHH.
24  
Army Tactical Symposium –1962, [19 October 1962], RG 73/1314, DHH.
23  

https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol29/iss2/7

12

Kasurak: Rowley and the Failure of Military Reform
KASURAK

13

Rowley’s approach to his task differed from what the Army had
done before regarding organisation and doctrine studies and, sadly,
what would follow his project. Rowley based his study on general
principles which were explicitly stated and conducted his work by a
data-driven approach which used staff research, operations research
studies, field trials and experiments which were consolidated and
filtered through a number of working groups. The top-down, ex
cathedra management style that had been typical of Canadian Army
doctrinal studies was ruled out by Walsh’s insistence on objective
trials and Rowley’s own inclinations.
Rowley organised the required studies on a branch basis, plus
several “functional studies” of fire support, anti-tank defence,
reconnaissance and surveillance, the armour/infantry relationship,
air defence, aviation and logistics. These “functional studies” targeted
the most problematic issues of divisional organisation. Although using
field trials and war games to the extent possible to develop and select
options, Rowley believed that ultimately, organisation was a matter
of professional judgement. Moreover, finding that the Army had
already embarked on a re-equipment program without firm concepts
and doctrine to back it up, he commented:
The first problem in studying organization is to find some rational basis
for the work. It seems reasonable to say, at first, that organizations stem
from tactical requirements. If we have a clearcut tactical doctrine, the
organizations to suit it should flow from it. However, the erratic and
almost haphazard development of organizations in the past lead one to
believe that the reverse is just as likely to be true. Tactics often seem
to develop from organizations and, of course, the equipment on hand.
What does seem certain is that there is, and indeed should be, a definite
connection between organizations and tactics.25

He therefore set out his own criteria and principles for organisation
design. In brief, these were:
• Flexibility – The organisation should have sufficient parts
to allow it to vary the proportion of strength allocated to

Army Tactics and Organization Board, Final Report, ATOB 1963 Activities, n.d.
[November 1963?], RG 87/165, DHH. Hereafter cited as ATOB Final Report.

25  
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protection, striking or other roles without disrupting the internal
organisation of its parts;
Simplicity – There must not be so many parts in an organisation
that the influence of the commander is too widely spread or on
too many levels of command;
Austerity – The organisation must not be burdened with such
a variety of complex and sophisticated equipment that it will
divert commanders from leadership and soldiers from the task of
contacting and destroying the enemy;
Durability – There must be a reserve to allow for some attrition
without a significant loss of effectiveness; and
Stability – The organisation should be designed so that
interference with basic structure is exceptional.

According to Rowley, military operations consisted of two basic
functions: hitting and guarding. Any organisation therefore required
a minimum of two components as well as a third component as
a reserve. Three component organisations were not flexible and
required the commander to break down one or more units, whereas
four component organisations allowed commanders to vary the
strength of hitting, guarding and reserve without much organisational
change. The problem was that if every level of the organisation had
four components, the organisation would quickly become too large,
unaffordable and unwieldy.
The extensive trials program included studies of a three versus
four company infantry battalion with two variants of the three
company version, the anti-tank fire unit assessing the trade-offs
between the SS11B and ENTAC missiles and the 106 mm recoilless
rifle, artillery trials and an armoured regiment organisation study.
The trials were combined with the results from operations research
studies and war games conducted by the Canadian Army Operations
Research Establishment (CAORE), the most notable of which were
the Iron Crown series of war games which assessed the effectiveness
of Canadian Army anti-tank equipment and doctrine.26

Combat Development and Tactical Doctrine Committee, Minutes of the 62/3
Meeting, 29 November 1962, RG 81/272, DHH; Combat Development and Tactical
Doctrine Committee, Minutes of the 63/1 Meeting, 18 February 1963, RG 81/272,
DHH; and ATOB Final Report, 311.

26  
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The trials and studies were brought together by a series of
coordination conferences chaired by Rowley. Participants included
ATOB senior staff, Army Headquarters arms directors, the director
general of military training and senior CAORE staff. Rowley chaired
the conferences which generally began with a staff paper which was
discussed by those present. Rowley would ask questions and let staff
explain and debate the issues. He would occasionally interject to
support or close off an issue and always summarised the consensus
reached by the end of discussion, although he clearly made his own
decisions and could overrule staff and advisors.27
The character of the debate within ATOB encouraged by Rowley
can best be seen in the discussion around the organisation of infantry
and armour. Staff presented a paper advocating the integration of the
two combat arms at the unit level, effectively creating a single combat
arm. Some ATOB senior staff objected, calling this arrangement
“inflexible” and “an uneconomic use of armour” while others argued
that it was necessary because infantry could not move without
armour support and it was unlikely that the infantry would ever be
in a position where tanks could not be well employed. The director
of armour did not see a great advantage, but ATOB staff claimed
it would increase unit spirit and efficiency. In this case, Rowley
summarised the discussion as agreeing that combining infantry and
armour at the unit level would be beneficial. The debate then moved
on to whether combining the arms at the unit level would improve
training. In this case, both the director of armour and the director
of infantry thought it would reduce competition between the two
arms if everyone was in the same corps while others suggested that
using the armour model of training would improve quality of the
end product. Rowley asked the group their opinions regarding the
interchangeability of soldiers between tanks and infantry and about
logistic concerns and did not hear any strong objections. There was a
strong consensus that mechanisation of infantry and the introduction
of the armoured personnel carrier (APC) would mean that command
would be exercised through radio communications as was already the
case for the armour corps. While there was some concern that the
span of control would become too great, Rowley did not think so and
thought that experience during the Second World War showed that
Army Tactics and Organization Board, Coordinating Conference No. 1, Digest of
Presentation – Infantry/Tank Relationship, 19 March 1963, RG 80/234, DHH.

27  

Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2020

15

Canadian Military History, Vol. 29 [2020], Iss. 2, Art. 7
16

Rowley and the Failure of Military Reform

radio command could work for infantry without difficulty. Overall,
Rowley summarised the discussion as concluding that there was “a
large body of opinion that favoured the ultimate amalgamation of
these two fighting arms.”28
The ATOB Final Report did not recommend the creation of a
single combat arm, even though it tilted heavily toward what Rowley
called the “Panzer” model. Rowley argued that this model, which
was tank-heavy but always integrated with infantry, was superior to
the alternatives of using tanks for infantry support or tanks alone.
Rowley was constrained in going further by terms of reference which
required all recommendations to be implementable by 1965. He was
also blocked by CGS Walsh and Vice-Chief Major-General J.P.E.
Bernatchez’s unwillingness to even consider the question. Rowley
proposed a study of the matter twice but was turned down each
time as “not practical” and out of step with the development of Paul
Hellyer’s White Paper. Walsh and Bernatchez had been more than
willing to combine all the support arms into an integrated service
battalion to meet operational needs, but apparently could not face
reorganisation of the combat arms. They were also likely influenced by
the knowledge that Rowley’s armour-heavy model was diametrically
opposed to Hellyer’s objective of an air portable “mobile force.”29
Overall, the Final Report decisively rejected existing Canadian
Army nuclear warfare doctrine which was based on “attack and
evade” principles and which rejected static deployments. The concept
required units to come together temporarily to attack the enemy
and then to rapidly disperse to avoid becoming a nuclear target.
Rowley, however, believed that what the doctrine manual called
“stabilize, contain and delineate” the enemy ultimately meant “stop.”
He pointed out that there had in fact been increased stress on digging
in, prepared rifle positions, the cover of obstacles by fire and the
occupation of ground. The report found that approved doctrine
was not consistent with what was practised in training, called for
in operational plans or with weapons and equipment. The division
Army Tactics and Organization Board, Coordinating Conference No. 1, Digest of
Presentation – Infantry/Tank Relationship, 19 March 1963, RG 80/234, DHH.
29  
MGen. J.P.E. Bernatchez, VCGS to Distribution List [ATOB, Canadian Army
Staff College and principal CFHQ army staff], Future Activities, Army Tactics
and Organization Board, 28 November 1963, RG 24, Vol. 18835, LAC; and Army
Combat Development and Tactical Doctrine Committee, Minutes of 63/4 Meeting,
10 December 1963, RG 81/272, DHH.
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proposed by Rowley would ideally be based on all arms battalions,
but under the constraints placed on the study would have to be based
on infantry and armour formations. The armour regiment, however,
would include almost double the number of tanks, the establishment
being raised from forty-seven to seventy-eight. Current anti-tank
missiles were not seen as much of a solution to the Warsaw Pact tank
hordes as they had a lower rate of fire and no better accuracy than
a tank gun while having less protection and being more expensive.
Rowley recommended that if more anti-tank forces were required they
should be supplied with more tanks. Infantry was to be mounted on
APCs, but the Final Report recommended more trials be conducted
before crews and tactics were decided.30
The Final Report was constrained by manpower limits from
strengthening close support and air defence artillery to the extent it
regarded as necessary. Field engineers, aviation and logistic elements
all required improvements beyond that which could be provided
within the limits placed on the division. The problems surfaced by
ATOB’s analysis were never resolved as operational requirements
cancelled further tank and infantry trials and the Army’s studies
were overtaken by parallel projects aimed at designing the “mobile
force” desired by Minister Paul Hellyer. Rowley and the ATOB would
spend the next year working on a study of the Army’s reconnaissance
needs, but while a detailed report was completed, little else was
accomplished. Rowley’s preface in his 1965 report on ATOB’s
disbandment complained of “frustration” and commented that:
ATOB then has had unique opportunities to study fundamental problems
of military organization on Canadian military activities. Unfortunately,
they did not, as ATOB’s work always seemed to be out of place with
the actual reorganization being carried out in the Canadian Army and,
in the event, the proposed division was never formed.31

Rowley was correct. Walsh had gone to the Chiefs of Staff Committee
for approval in principle to reorganise the Army in March 1963,
months before the Final Report had been completed. By the time
he was able to go the Minister in May 1964, the task was to make
the Army fit the overall needs of the Hellyer White Paper. Although
ATOB Final Report, 60-68, 96-100.
ATOB Report on 1965 Activities, n.d., RG 24, Vol. 18835, LAC.
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Walsh was able to take some steps to reorganise, in September
1964 Air Chief Marshal Frank Miller, the chief of the defence staff,
deferred any more changes to the Army until there was an integrated
defence program to guide the Forces as a whole.32
The ATOB was the high point of the Army’s ability to solve
tactical problems and design a future force. It combined multiple
methodologies and followed a process that utilised staff opinion
rather than overriding it. Yet rational analysis had met its limit.
Even progressives such as Walsh and Bernatchez would not consider
a radical change to the organisation of the combat arms. And while
the Army itself had abandoned top-down policy development, the
political level had not. Hellyer’s mobile force initiative replicated
Simonds and Graham’s approach by beginning with the answer and
asking staff to fill in the details. Fact-based decision making had its
limits even among the various schools of progressives.

swan song – the officer development board
The report of the Officer Development Board (ODB), tabled in 1969,
is the work for which Rowley is best remembered and is arguably
his greatest contribution to the Canadian military profession. Like
his other projects, it failed to gain much acceptance at the time.
Its recommendations would languish for over thirty years before
implementation.
The armed services had traditionally not seen education as the
most important quality of officership, favouring character instead.
In its final report the ODB would note that about 60 per cent of
candidates accepted into the officer corps each year had less than a
university degree and a majority only had junior matriculation (Grade
10).33 By the 1960s, opinion in the Army was divided: traditionalists
LGen. G. Walsh, CGS, to Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff, Canadian Divisional
Reorganization, 1 March 1963; LGen. G. Walsh to the Minister, Organization of
the Filed Force, White Paper on Defence, 7 May 1964; and ACM Frank Miller,
CDS to COpR [MGen. J. Allard], Organization of the Field Force, Royal Canadian
Engineers, 29 September 1964, all in RG 1223, Ser 1, File 361, DHH.
33  
“Report of the Officer Development Board: Volume I (including Annexes),” in
The Report of the Officer Development Board, ed. Wakelam and Coombs, 66. This
facsimile of Volume I of the ODB report is the most accessible source and will be
cited in lieu of archival sources. The report can also be found at RG 82/140, DHH.
Hereafter cited as ODB Report.
32  
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continued to stress personal character and field experience, but
progressives saw a need to improve the intellectual level of the Army
and improve its standing in the wider community. Air Chief Marshal
Frank Miller, the chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee and
shortly to be named the first chief of the defence staff (CDS), directed
the inter-service Personnel Members Committee (PMC) to initiate a
study to develop a rationale for the services’ need for officers with
university degrees. Miller was apparently motivated by the Glassco
Commission’s criticism of the services’ ability to manage a modern
military organisation.34
The PMC not only concluded that the command of nuclear-armed
forces based on increasingly sophisticated technology demanded
higher education levels, but also that the armed forces were becoming
an unattractive employer to the most intellectually capable portion of
the population. The PMC estimated that the army and navy required
two-thirds of their officers to be degree holders while the air force
required about half of its officers to complete university.35
Jean Allard inherited the file when he took over as chief of the
defence staff from Miller. He faced the added difficulties of trying
to determine what officership in a unified armed service meant and
how to unify the former services’ officer development programs into
a coherent whole. Allard circulated a development plan of his own
to key staff and, based on the responses he received, decided that a
full-time study group under a senior officer was required to address
the issues involved.36 Allard turned to Rowley, then on his terminal
posting approaching compulsory retirement age, to lead the study.
The mandate he gave to Rowley was:
To examine all phases of the regular officer profession from selection
and initial training to the highest levels, with a view of producing an
Officer Development Plan designed to ensure maximum efficiency and
Armed Forces Sub-Committee on Pay and Allowances, Submission to the
Personnel Members Committee, Service Requirements for University Graduates, 15
July 1964, Larry Motiuk Papers, Canadian Forces College, Toronto. Hereafter cited
as Motiuk Papers, CFC.
35  
Armed Forces Sub-Committee on Pay and Allowances, Submission to the
Personnel Members Committee, Service Requirements for University Graduates, 15
July 1964, Motiuk Papers, CFC.
36  
Gen. J.V. Allard, Officer Development Plan, 25 May 1967, Motiuk Papers,
CFC. While Allard’s cover letter has survived, a copy of the outline plan could
not be located.
34  
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economy of resources in the selection, training and education of the
officer corps required to command and administer the Armed Forces.37

Rowley approached the problem in an expansive manner. He told
the RMC Faculty Board that “[n]o Canadian [had] ever waxed
philosophical about the Canadian Armed Forces” but that he “would
be developing a rationale, then a philosophy, for the profession of
arms in Canada.”38 He would start by looking at the rationale for
standing forces in Canada and the requirements of the profession of
arms before going on to look at education levels, attrition rates, the
development program for officers throughout their career and the
organisation of the officer development system. As at the ATOB,
Rowley would allow his team to work and develop concepts within
the framework he had established but without constraints based on
his personal views.39
The Board’s work on a concept of military professionalism began
with a paper written by Brigadier B.J. Guimond, the deputy chairman.
Guimond outlined Canada’s military history and concluded that
although Canada’s militia tradition had been successful in generating
large forces during the two world wars, it had failed to develop the
military profession. Officers “remained an appendage rather than an
integral part of society. Admired on memorial days, [they were] soon
relegated to the cloister of [their] garrison which many a Canadian
considered little more than a British enclave totally unrelated to
his society.” This perception, according to Guimond, was deserved.
Trained in the British military tradition, its history and imperial
geopolitics, the Canadian officer had failed to fit into the intellectual
and professional pattern of Canadian life. Colonialism had another
negative effect on the Canadian military profession. Despite Canada’s
great material contributions during the two world wars, Canadian
military officials had little or no access to decision making at the
theatre level or to grand strategy.40

ODB Report, 5.
Royal Military College Faculty Board, 152nd Meeting, 28 November 1967, in
author’s possession.
39  
Randall Wakelam, “Officer Professional Education in the Canadian Forces and
the Rowley Report, 1969,” Historical Studies in Education/Revue d’histoire de
l’éducation 16, 2 (2004): 297.
40  
Brig. B.J. Guimond, The Rationale for the Officer Development Study, 28
December 1967, Motiuk Papers, CFC.
37  
38  

https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol29/iss2/7

20

Kasurak: Rowley and the Failure of Military Reform
KASURAK

21

Canada’s foreign and defence policy required a reversal of
traditional ways. The NATO-Warsaw Pact confrontation meant
that Canada now had to maintain forces-in-being which were highly
trained and capable of immediate response. Moreover, while many of
Canada’s policy goals could be pursued from within the structure of
alliances, there had been a “gradual metamorphosis” into autonomous
or semi-autonomous forces which could act as peacekeeping or
intervention forces to prevent great power confrontations. Officers not
only had to be able to manage such forces in operations, but they had
to be capable of devising strategy and “be prepared to think in terms
of our national interests where they do not coincide with, or bear little
relation to, those of our allies.” Within twenty years, Guimond could
see the resolution of the “German problem” and the relaxation of
tension between the two blocks to the point where an active military
role in Europe would lose its validity.41
Guimond’s paper served as a platform for discussion within the
Board and much of his thinking was reflected in the ODB’s final
report. It adopted his concern that colonialism had had adverse effects
on the Canadian military profession. The ODB final report stated:
It is a measure of the total absence of significant dialogue between
the military and political elements of the country that while the
officer, through his initial development and subsequent training, was,
consciously or not, following a policy of Imperial centralization, his
political masters were opposing this same policy. …
Gradually we find the professional Canadian officer isolating himself
from his own society and viewing his military role in terms of Imperial
defence and strategy, with little or no concern for the study of the
strategic problems likely to face his own country. … [T]his Canadian
officer had no conception of the strategic implications of Canada being
at once an Atlantic and a Pacific power, or of the fact that his country’s
vital interests could quite possibly be deeply affected by policies
developed to the south, including the far reaches of the South American
continent, rather than in the protection of Singapore, Hong Kong or
Gibraltar.

Guimond, The Rationale for the Officer Development Study, CFC. Guimond’s
hypothesis was correct. He wrote in 1967 and the Berlin Wall came down in 1989.
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It is astonishing to realize that despite its geographical position, and
the absence of any immediate military threat, Canada could afford to
live without a realistic strategy, and indeed without strategists; but the
fact remains.42

Echoing Guimond’s paper, the final report argued that “Canada
supplied troops and material for war machines to be planned,
organized and commanded from elsewhere.”43
The ODB final report laid less emphasis than Guimond on the
Canadian Forces as an independent intervention force and stressed
the North American Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD) and
NATO alliance commitments, commenting that it was unlikely that
commitments to the United Nations (UN) for major forces would
increase. Nevertheless, the final report envisaged much the same
forces as Guimond had, namely balanced, strategically mobile land,
sea and air forces. Forces that would be able to “survive and make a
viable contribution” under conditions of tactical nuclear warfare and
forces that would employ modern weapon systems and computerassisted command and control. Officers in this high-tech force would
have to be capable of managing across the continuum of combat
intensity and across military environments. The requirements for
managing this force would be not only technical education, but an
increased understanding of the social sciences and the liberal arts.44
Given the Board’s assessment of the armed forces Canada
would maintain in the future, it is not surprising that they strongly
supported a military profession based on expertise. They quoted the
Prussian edict of 1808:
The only title to an officer’s commission shall be, in time of peace,
education and professional knowledge; in time of war, distinguished
valour and perception. From the entire nation, therefore, all individuals
who possess these qualities are eligible for the highest military posts.
All previously existing class preference in the military establishment
is abolished, and every man, without regard to his origins, has equal
duties and equal rights.45

ODB
ODB
44  
ODB
45  
ODB
42  
43  

Report, 22-23.
Report, 23.
Report., 31-33.
Report, 18-19.
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Rather hopefully, the Board noted that under this policy “a new
military aristocracy of education and achievement emerged.” Corporate
spirit would knit the officer corps into a professional community which
would become in turn a highly respected social entity.46
A second major principle adopted by Rowley’s group was the
rejection of Samuel Huntington’s definition of the military profession
as “managers of violence.” This concept places the combat arms at
the centre of the profession and renders supporting specialists, such
as logisticians, second-class citizens.47 The Board stated that, while
this definition may have worked in the simpler past, “the enormous
complexity of the modern military function makes a simple definition
of this nature irrelevant and renders comparison on a function basis
with other professions artificial and limiting.”48 Rowley adopted a
“big tent” view of the profession. No military branches or occupations
were “core” with the others peripheral. Moreover, the officer corps
was expected to contain soldier-diplomats to manage peacekeeping
and alliance operations and soldier-scholars to carry out research to
expand the body of knowledge of the military profession. Rowley and
the Board expected that a great deal of research should be undertaken
in the area of national security studies by the military itself and that
it should lead to the award of Master of Military Science degrees to
serving officers.49
The final report also contained a statement of “the canons of
the military ethic.” This was a short list of responsibilities about
one page in length. While all of the soldierly virtues it contained
were traditional, there was no reference to the inevitability of war
or implication that war was an acceptable ingredient of a nation’s
foreign policy. This explicitly tied the military ethic to a liberal, rather
than a conservative, realist philosophy. The statement was otherwise
unexceptional, listing the duty of upholding constitutional authority,
loyalty to the service, respect to other members of the profession, care
of subordinates and unlimited liability to carry out duties. However,
perhaps with a view to the recent “revolt of the admirals,” it also

ODB Report, 18-19.
Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of
Civil-Military Relations (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1957), 12.
48  
ODB Report, 18.
49  
ODB Report, 32, 47.
46  
47  
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contained the duty to “maintain and respect the legally constituted
hierarchy of the Armed Forces.”50
The core elements of the report were radical. The British colonial
heritage of the armed forces was criticised as having limited the
development of a truly Canadian military. Officership based on
expertise was proposed for the officer corps and the expectations
placed on officers expanded dramatically to include commanding
elements of all the services, actively contributing to the development
of national security policy and strategy and being scholars engaged in
expanding the knowledge of their profession. None of these demands
drew much fire individually; what became lightning rods for criticism
were the degreed officer corps and the centralisation of the officer
development system proposed by Rowley’s report.
Rowley found considerable opposition to a degreed officer corps
amongst his senior Canadian Forces colleagues. The commandant
of the Staff College, Brigadier-General W.A. Milroy told him that
education was not the same as military leadership, or even the main
component of it. A member of the College directing staff summed
up by saying “the degree requirement [was] far too restrictive for the
type of fighting leader we need.” Major-General Bruce Macdonald,
the deputy chief of personnel, and Vice-Admiral R.L. Hennessy, the
Comptroller General, both thought insisting on a degree would increase
attrition in the “great variety of officer positions which do not now,
and never will, require a university education.” Brigadier-General
S. Mathwin Davin, the director general of systems management in
Canadian Forces Headquarters and soon-to-be commandant of the
National Defence College, claimed “a Bachelor’s degree for a hired
killer – even if we call him a ‘peace keeper’ etc. may well turn out to
be a handicap.”51
These comments gave Rowley pause and he asked his team
to consider whether they had been too uncompromising regarding
a degreed officer corps, but he did not ultimately overrule them.
The ODB final report justified a bachelor’s degree as the baseline
ODB Report, 36-37.
MGen. R. Rowley, Report of Visit to CASC, 7-9 Feb 68, 16 February 1968,
Annex B, Second Meeting, 8 February 1968, Motiuk Papers, CFC; VAdm. R.L.
Hennessy to DPRC, Degree Requirements – Canadian Armed Forces, 20 February
1968, Motiuk Papers, CFC; MGen. Bruce F. Macdonald to DPRC, Baccalaureate
Degrees, 27 February 1968, Motiuk Papers, CFC; and BGen. S. Mathwin Davis to
DPRC, Baccalaureate Degrees, 19 February 1968, Motiuk Papers, CFC.
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requirement for officership primarily on the requirement to be able to
recruit from the intellectually top 15 per cent of the male population.
This group was attending university in ever greater numbers and
the Board believed the non-university pool of promising candidates
would soon be too small to meet the Forces’ needs. They also
believed that with technology becoming increasingly sophisticated
and demands of advising the government on geopolitics becoming
more complex that “it [was] inconceivable that the future defence of
the nation should be entrusted to officers who are not both literate
and scientifically literate.”52
The second major issue which stood between the Board’s report
and implementation was the architecture of the officer development
system. The Board proposed a single authority, the Canadian Defence
Education Centre (CDEC), to manage the entire system. There
would be two colleges under it: the Canadian Defence College offering
in-service education to commissioned officers and the Canadian
Military College providing undergraduate and graduate education.
CDEC would be in Ottawa at the Rockcliffe base and would not only
provide its courses from that location but would also include a library
and wargaming facility. Ottawa would also be home to a National
Security Course offered by a pan-governmental Centre for Security
Studies. This would provide strategic studies components of CDEC
courses as well as be a government “think tank.”53
Richard Preston, in his history of the Royal Military College,
blames the failure of the Department of National Defence to
implement the ODB Report on what he saw as Rowley’s attempt
to recommend an ideal system without regard to the cost.54 Yet it
appears that Preston’s explanation is too simple. Rowley—along
with Allard and Léo Cadieux, the defence minister—recognised
that full implementation of the Board’s report was too expensive
to be accomplished all at once and a phased approach would be
needed. Randall Wakelam has pointed to the number of sacred cows
implementation would have harmed. Placing a two-star commander
between the various existing colleges and the CDS would have

ODB Report, 38-41.
Wakelam, “Officer Professional Education in the Canadian Forces,” 287-314
provides the best overview of the structural proposals and their inherent problems.
54  
Richard Preston, To Serve Canada: A History of the Royal Military College Since
the Second World War (Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 1991), 100-01.
52  
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downgraded the existing institutions. The mix of civil and military
governance for both academics and officer education was radical and
likely unacceptable to many in both communities. The centralisation
of all the military colleges to Ottawa would have been difficult for
incumbent faculty members to accept and would have raised questions
regarding seniority and family relocation.55
The ODB recommendations melted away like a snowball left on
a hot radiator. The replacement of Rowley with the Commandant
of the Canadian Army Staff College, Major-General Milroy, put
an officer in charge of implementing a report who had doubted its
fundamental premises. With the Forces downsizing, Milroy advocated
“a new, more modest plan.” The gaming facility and strategic studies
centre were dropped as too costly as was the school for upgrading
candidates to university entrance level. Cadieux approved a stage
one of centralising post-commissioning development at Canadian
Forces Base Rockcliffe with a second phase of moving the military
colleges to that site along with post-graduate education, but no action
was ever taken.56 According to Milroy’s later recollection, he elected
not to implement the centralised model proposed by Rowley based
on his own appreciation of Ottawa realpolitik. He instead set up
a Canadian Defence Education Establishments organisation which
preserved the three military colleges. Cadieux apparently improved
Milroy’s “understanding” of the political value of three colleges for
regional visibility and cadet recruiting. There were also those outside
the department who cautioned that centralising military education
and creating a strategic studies centre in Ottawa might smack of
an attempt to create a “military-industrial complex” and a centre
which would have a disproportionate effect on influencing government
policy.57 In the end, not even Milroy’s Canadian Defence Education
Establishments survived. By 1972, the presence of academic education
in National Defence Headquarters had been reduced to that of a staff
colonel within the Assistant Deputy Minister (Personnel) Branch.58

Wakelam, “Officer Professional Education in the Canadian Forces,” 306-08.
Defence Council – Minute of 271st Meeting – 25 August 1969; and Defence
Council – Minute of 272nd Meeting – 4 September 1969, RG 73/1223, Box 68, File
1394, DHH.
57  
Dr. J.A. Corry [former Principal of Queen’s University] to Major-General R.
Rowley, 16 December 1968, Motiuk Papers, CFC.
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In his forward to the ODB Report, General Allard concluded
with the comment that:
It matters little whether the Forces have their present manpower
strength and financial budget, or half of them, or double them; without
a properly educated, effectively trained, professional officer corps the
Forces would, in the future, be doomed to, at the best, mediocrity; at
the worst, disaster.59

Allard’s fears materialised in the collapse of discipline in stabilisation
missions in Croatia and Somalia in the early 1990s. The Somalia
incident, centred on the death of a Somali prisoner in custody, led to
a public inquiry which became so controversial that defence minister
of the day, Douglas Young, terminated it. To shape the government’s
response to the inquiry, he appointed four prominent academics to
make recommendations. While Young’s academic advisors did not
agree as to how the army should be restructured, they did agree that
the officer corps was undereducated and out of touch with Canadian
society. Jack Granatstein summed it up by commenting that the
officer corps was “remarkably ill-educated…surely one of the worst
in the Western world.”60 A major focus of the reforms initiated by
Young included a curriculum for RMC placing greater emphasis on
the arts and social sciences, introducing national security studies
and strategic studies to the Canadian Forces College and requiring
officers to hold a baccalaureate degree. By 2009, the goal of a degreed
officer corps had been substantially attained.61
Rowley’s structural reforms from 1969 were also accepted at about
the same time. A Canadian Defence Academy (CDA) was established
in 2002 that had one academic college (RMC) and one professional
college (Canadian Forces College) under it. The CDA is the Forces’
champion for lifelong learning. It is not, however, concentrated on one
campus in Ottawa.
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conclusion – the importance of failed reform
The world loves successful commanders—but why should we care
about a failed one? To answer this question, one must understand how
the model of military professionalism defined by Rowley’s initiatives
was based on knowledge and represented the progressive wing of
the profession. The opposing, traditional model was an officership
based on character, rather than knowledge. It was not interested in
dealing with strategic or political issues and was content to have
its strategic architecture designed and delivered by Great Power
allies. The leadership style of the traditional school was, as Horn
and Bentley have pointed out, hierarchical and authoritarian.
Rowley diverged from these characteristics on almost every point.
He was a champion of officership based on knowledge, during both his
tenure as commandant of the Canadian Army Staff College, where he
expanded the curriculum and tried to nurture soldier-scholars, and
later as the chair of the Officer Development Board, where he endorsed
a degreed officer corps. Knowledge-based solutions—like merging the
armour and infantry corps—were to be tested, not rejected out of
hand. Moreover, his vision of the profession extended beyond that of
tactical technician to participation in national policy and strategy.
The ODB recommendation of an interdepartmental strategic studies
centre in Ottawa would have created an institution that could have
both bridged the gap between the military and the political level and
generated a Canadian national strategic point of view.
Rowley’s version of the military profession was hierarchical
but not autocratic. As the commandant of the Army Tactics and
Organization Board he was not afraid to make decisions after a full
and free discussion of options with his staff. These discussions were
collegial and not driven by a top-down solution in search of staff
substantiation. In the case of the ODB, Rowley did not overrule staff
on the recommendation of a degreed officer corps, even though he
had some personal reservations and the knowledge that many of his
senior colleagues were opposed to the idea. Rowley’s way of doing
business was more inclusive and professional than that of most of his
senior colleagues.
However, rather than a knowledge-based profession that meshed
with the political leadership of the country and which was able to
develop and utilise the talent of all levels of the profession, the Canadian
Army and the Canadian Armed Forces pursued a traditional path.
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The period that followed was marked by continuing divergence of the
Canadian Forces and the political level, with the Forces “working”
less with the political level and more often “shirking” and pursuing
their own agenda, notably the preservation of heavy forces on NATO’s
Central Front.62 The perception by Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau
and Defence Minister Donald Macdonald that the army was shirking
led directly to the Management Review Group and the replacement
of Canadian Forces Headquarters by a civilian-dominated National
Defence Headquarters.
Rather than increasing its education level and becoming more
conversant and comfortable with civilian management technologies
and civilian society in general, the Canadian Forces descended
into what one observer has called a state of “moral panic” over a
perceived imposition of incompatible civilian values on the military.
This led to decades of resistance to the expansion of legislatively
and constitutionally guaranteed rights and the inclusion of women,
minorities and members of the LGBTQ2 community in the military.63
In the opinion of Horn and Bentley, “many of the senior leadership fell
back on their underlying culture, namely secrecy and stone-walling
outside criticism.”64
This top-down hierarchical approach drove army planning during
the 1970s and 1980s. Its System Study, aimed at redesigning the army
to reflect perceived requirements, started with a solution dictated
before any study was done—that infantry would be the primary arm
that the others would serve. It was also premised on the assumption
that Canada would field an entire army corps when it struggled to
project even a single brigade during much of the period. The army’s
indulgence in magical thinking ended only in 1994 when the colonels
collectively revolted at the Army Doctrine and Tactics Board and
refused to write a full set of doctrinal publications to support it.65
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The failure to pursue the model of professionalism represented by
Rowley led to professional failure and then collapse in Somalia.66 While
it might be too bold to state that if Rowley’s collective reforms had
been implemented, Somalia might have been avoided, its possibility
would have been materially reduced. In addition, the government and
the Canadian Forces’ own reactions to Somalia recognised at least the
degreed officer corps and the need to develop higher level strategic
thinking in the officer corps. Understanding why Rowley failed and
the cost of failure is perhaps more important than understanding
successful reforms that have been accomplished since.
◆◆◆◆
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